“What on earth do these events have in Common?” I hear you cry. Immediately followed by the “Why it’s relevant to current energy decision-making” supplemental.
Remember, “People want to do a Good Job”, and this applies historically, now, and in the future. Attainment for each individual creates a personal belief of their self-esteem and worth which transcends all industries and trades – scientists, engineers, business directors, doctors and, yes, even Lawyers.
However, the fundamental question is to define the phrase “a Good Job.” Simplistically, the basic remits were for:
- Grenfell to improve the appearance and thermal performance of the Tower Block,
- Flixborough to maintain production through the installation of bye-pass pipework,
- Fukushima to generate electricity from a coastal power plant.
While those involved in the decision-making process accepted the proposed solutions, in each case, the simple business objectives described above became coloured by business expediencies of cost, time, and delivery. Catastrophic incidents ensued.
Inherent Safety Concepts and Their Evolution
Following the Flixborough incident some 50 years ago, Trevor Kletz outlined the concept of inherent safety that the Center for Chemical Process Safety has developed into four decision-making categories; substitute, minimise, moderate, and simplify. (Ref: S. Murphy & G. Ackroyd – IChemE, September 2024)
At Grenfell, a different cladding could have been adopted. For Flixborough, a peer review of the inexperienced engineers’ design modification and, at Fukushima, moving the reactor site further inland above the flood plan to avoid the consequences of a 1:1000+ year seismic event are 20:20 hindsight observations.
The nuclear industry is very fortunate in having an international safety oversight organisation, the IAEA, that looks to ensure the global industry is safe through the adoption of common standards and principles. However, not being a clairvoyant, I cannot predict the future, and therefore, I remain concerned that unfortunate consequences may arise if business decisions are made in a blinkered or isolated manner.
Solutions and Ongoing Challenges in Nuclear Safety and Waste Management
Whilst not in the same league as the above headline events, there are current developments that are worth further investigation. Accepting the concept of inherent safety to avoid rather than control hazards is behind the drive to develop an inherently safe nuclear reactor. Whilst, yes, the explosive power of the current PWR is very real, there are two much greater problems to address from both the existing reactors and any ‘new’ design: the management of partially used fuel and the management of contaminated ground.
The long-term remit of the UK’s NDA is to rehabilitate all nuclear sites to their original non-nuclear state. Considerable progress has been made, however; the UK domestic nuclear fuel inventory is scheduled to increase, adding to the pressure for an ultimate solution. Some are reluctant to adopt the principle of recycling, preferring a ‘once-through’ approach. While highly wasteful in that some 55% of the recoverable energy remains in the used fuel assembly, the prime concern with the ‘once-through’ approach is the inextricable deterioration during long-term storage and disposal.
Managing the Stability and Disposal Challenges of Irradiated Fuel
A new unirradiated oxide fuel pellet of any design is chemically very stable and difficult to dissolve to release the individual components even at elevated temperatures utilising strong acids. However, when irradiated, the physical properties and chemical composition change, making it significantly easier to dissolve; the pellets become unstable and susceptible to chemical attrition.
This applies to both the existing fuel designs and the proposed much smaller ‘Pebble Bed’ type. With some highly pessimistic and unsubstantiated suggestions for irradiated products needing to be isolated from humankind, (whatever that means given the doom-mongers rhetoric of a trajectory for total annihilation by war, pestilence and greed) for 100,000 years, the storing and disposing of irradiated fuel assemblies will require new technologies. Being at an elevated temperature from fission product decay, any type of fuel container, even thick-wall copper, is unlikely to survive, resulting in the fuel being subject to constant groundwater attrition. As discussed by the UK RWMAC committee in the 1980s, for secure disposal, a multi-barrier approach must be considered mandatory, assuming the various individual barriers are deemed to have failed – for example, breaching of the vault due to structural collapse leading to immediate gross water ingress.
As the PWR Fuel Pin is assumed compromised, as evidenced by contaminated reactor coolant, humans would be exposed to the products from untreated fuel after two engineered barriers, a vault and a container, have failed. Vitrification would add a further barrier that would last at least 4000 years, as evidenced by historical remains found in the Mediterranean Sea.
Challenges and Controversies in In-Situ Immobilisation of Radioactive Contaminants
In-situ immobilisation of contaminated ground contradicts the NDA principle mission statement by leaving radioactive waste in an accessible near-surface location. Given that all nuclear sites are contaminated due to incidents such as spills or through activation from reactor operations the challenges to clean the sites are numerous: for example, confirming the contamination plume depth and reach, the Net Present Value assessment for the different treatment options, and the chemical stability of the ensuing product.
It is worth remembering that the alternative synthetic rock process, SYNROCK, was abandoned in favour of glassification/vitrification technology. Attempting to validate, to regulatory standards, the solidified product from in-situ processing when the constituent proportions are highly variable and unknown will be challenging, particularly for any more unstable clinker created in the vicinity of the treatment process.
Additionally, the radioactive contaminants will volatilise at different rates during any processing and potentially condense outside the process envelope, increasing the contamination spread. This also occurs in the Sellafield Vitrification plant; however, the products are captured in the associated off-gas clean-up plant. Attempting to create a similar process in an open environment will be challenging.
In closing, as the nuclear renaissance gathers pace and the need for business decisions accelerates, I hope I have demonstrated that it is essential that the thought process is broad and that ‘thinking outside the Box’ is a prerequisite. As developed by Trevor Keltz, in making business proposals and decisions we must address the important questions and ensure the proposed solution have considered:
Substitution, Risk Minimisation, Moderation, and Simplification.
With its Energy and Nuclear network of international contacts, Prospect Law is well-positioned to help and support your endeavours as you explore opportunities in this important Energy industry. Our expertise and resources are at your disposal, providing you with the reassurance and confidence you need to make informed decisions.
The personal observations of
John Ireland, Senior Consultant
About the Author
John Ireland is an internationally experienced energy specialist and senior business executive skilled in the development, negotiation, and management of businesses and technically complex contracts within both the Government and private sectors. John has grown complex businesses in Asia and the Middle East, and assisted international organisations to develop business in and from the UK through joint ventures and partnerships.
